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THE DAUER-BROWN LETTERS: TOWARDS A
COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL EDUCATION
EDWARD A. DAUER* AND Louis M. BROWN**
[Edward A. Dauer is President of the National Center for Preventive
Law at the University of Denver. Louis M. Brown developed and
advocates preventive law jurisprudence. In this dialogue, drawn from an
exchange of correspondence between them, Dauer and Brown focus their
insights on how best to gear law school curricula to train lawyers to
handle the complexities of a "real life" practice.]
I. DAUER TO BROWN-JULY 1, 1988
't occurred to me recently, as I was viewing my inventory of unmet
.obligations and unachieved ambitions, that we are about to enter that
new academic year which will be my twentieth as a legal educator. There
is a roundness to that number, which attracts reminiscences even beyond
its numerical symmetry, and so I have given in to the temptation to
review some of the high and low points of these past two decades. While
my observations would not withstand scrutiny as empirical findings,
having been a student of the sixties myself I can insist that they be
accorded value merely because I care deeply about them.
Even then, as a law student, it occurred to me that there was something
fundamentally wrong with clinical legal education. Mind you, I am a big
fan of clinical legal education. I mean, therefore, not to criticize it, but
rather to criticize the way in which we have used it-or not used it. In
particular, there is in most law schools in the United States an equation:
Clinical education equals skills training equals litigation skills. Perhaps
that equation first began with the legal services model of clinical
training,' wherein service opportunities to the disadvantaged came only
in the areas of advocacy representation and even then only in a limited
* Dean and Professor, University of Denver, College of Law. A.B., Brown University,
1966; LL.B., Yale University, 1969.
** Of Counsel, Sanders, Barnet, Jacobson, Goldman, and Mosk, Los Angeles, California.
Professor Emeritus, University of Southern California School of Law. A.B., University of
Southern California, 1930; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1933; LL.D. (Hon.), Manhattan
College, 1977.
' R. Condlin, The Moral Failure of Clinical Education, in THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS'
ROLES AND LAWYERS' Emics at 332-35 (1983); Grossman, Clinical Legal Education: History and
Diagnosis, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 162, 173-80 (1974).
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range of topics such as entitlements, landlord tenant, criminal matters
and the like. But whatever its cause, it led then and does now to an
exploitation of clinical teaching methodologies which is depressingly
narrow in at least two dimensions. The first dimension has to do with the
subject matters of clinical education. The second has to do with the
subject matters of legal education as a whole.
Even if we were to adopt skills training as the entire ambition of
clinical methodologies, it seems particularly unfortunate that the advo-
cacy model has so dominated that field. Indeed, I have often thought it
rather odd that law school curricula include both substantive courses and
separate courses on trial lawyering skills,2 but do not include substantive
courses and separate courses on non-trial lawyering skills. That suggests
that we believe either that non-trial lawyering skills will be taught
perforce in the substantive courses, or that there is no coherent body of
skills knowledge outside the advocacy area. Since both of those proposi-
tions are nonsense, the anomaly remains unexplained.
And on the other score, as Robert Gorman 3 taught us many years ago,
clinical legal education can do vastly more than teach skills. It is, to pick
just one example, a wonderful opportunity for students to do some
participant observation4 in the sociology of legal institutions in addition
to their skills training-to observe how courts and agencies behave under
stress, to observe the linkage between institutional constraints and
substantive evolution, to develop a more refined and useful jurisprudence
of the legal process as a whole. But to do that, students would need to
know two things-first, that that is what is expected of them during their
clinical placement; and second, something about how actually to do
participant observation.
The long and the short of it is that clinical teaching modalities have a
great deal to offer the substantive curriculum in addition to (not in
' At the two law schools in Colorado, 39 courses deal exclusively (or nearly so) with
litigation: Administration of Criminal Justice, Advanced Litigation, Advanced Trial
Advocacy, Civil Procedure, Complex Litigation, Complex Civil Litigation, Criminal Proce-
dure; Criminal Procedures: Adjudicative Process, Criminal Procedure Practicum, Evidence,
Federal Courts, Federal Jurisdiction, International Human Rights Clinic, International
Moot Court Competition, Internship/Externship Program (primarily litigation oriented),
Lawyering Practice Courses (student run law office); Legal Aid: Civil Practice I & II, Legal
Aid: Criminal Practice I & II, Legal Representation of the Poor, Natural Resource
Litigation Clinic, Post Trial Procedure, Pre-trial Practicum, Pre-trial Procedure, Public
Interest Litigation, Rothenberg Moot Court Competition; Seminar: Exclusionary Rule,
Trial Advocacy, Trial and Evidence, Trial and Evidence Practicum, Trial Competition, Trial
Tactics. At a quarter system school (D.U.) students typically enroll in 35 to 40 courses to
earn their J.D. degree. At a semester system school (C.U.) the number is much smaller.
' Gorman, Clinical Legal Education: A Prospectus, 44 S. Cal. L, Rev. 537, 555 (1971).
4 I. Robertson, SocioLOGY at 42 (3rd ed. 1987) defines participant observation as "a
method in which a researcher becomes directly involved and interacts with other partici-
pants in the social processes and behavior being studied or examined."
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substitution for) their ability to teach what we often call skills. And that,
even within the arena of skills, the conventional clinical focus is a narrow
vision of what lawyers do and simply does not reflect reality. While
litigation skills remain as an essential part of the lawyer's competence,
and should not be diminished in our law school curricula, we must also
recognize that much of what many lawyers do has little to do with being
an advocate in a courtroom.
The past twenty years have seen no changes in that regard. It was not
possible for me as a law student in the middle 1960's to take a clinical
"laboratory" course in Commercial Law as an adjunct to my Commercial
Law classroom; and at virtually every law school in America it is not
possible to do that today. Why has there been no change? One possibility
is that these thoughts simply represent a bad idea. (But since this is my
reminiscence I shall ignore that possibility.)
Some of the resistance, at least at one or two of the schools with which
I have been associated, comes from the most astonishing quarter. In
many law schools the clinical law office operates like a rugby team. Not
a football team. A rugby team. The difference, which I hope the metaphor
will capture, is this: At most colleges football is a varsity sport. The
players are officially chosen, they wear clean uniforms, and what they do
is at or near the heart of the life of the institution. Rugby, at most
universities, is not a varsity sport. It is a club sport. Which means that
the players do not get clean uniforms; they have a coach only if they can
con somebody into it; they play on the fringes of the school's traditions
(and on the fringes of civility); there is a camaraderie of the beer keg in
rugby which comes partly from the very recognition that it is different
from and separated from-and not entirely loved by-the mainstream of
more delicate people who refuse to have anything to do with it.
Clinics in many law schools behave just like that. There is an elan and
an esprit (the only two French words I know) in the typical clinical law
office, which comes at least in part from the idea that the law office is
separate from and an antidote to the ordinary day of the classroom.
Integrating the clinic into the mainstream of the law school curriculum
might therefore remove (some may fear) much of its attraction, and its
constituency. That is, if true, unfortunate.
Maybe this is all sour grapes. It was in 1972 that I first wrote in the
Journal of Legal Education5 an essay calling for the application of
clinical teaching strategies beyond their traditional advocacy confines.
And it was in 1978-ten years ago-that you and I together published a
set of teaching materials which we had hoped would show the way for
See Dauer, Expanding Clinical Teaching Methods into the Commercial Law Curriu-
lam, 25 J. LEGAL EDUC. 76 (1973).
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combining notions of lawyer skill with notions of lawyer philosophy.6
Why is it, do you suppose, that with all of the pages written on the
psychology and on the past and the future of legal education that the two
decades during which I have been engrossed by legal education have seen
virtually no change in these very important areas? Ah, will the world
ever change, to conform to my expectations of it?
II. BROWN TO DAUER, JULY 10, 1988
Before plunging into an effort to answer the questions as you put them,
I want to make sure that I have the correct questions in mind. I do not
think you are suggesting that there have been no advances in clinical
legal education in the past two decades. There have been.7 There is more
of it now. And there have been developments in the techniques of
teaching in at least two directions: an increase in simulation as a way of
presenting material and the use of audio-visual techniques. Perhaps also
a third technique: the use of the computer in the design of self education
possibilities."
What you are saying to me is that all of those developments have
occurred in the area of litigation and dispute. I must agree. So that your
question is why has there been a neglect of that aspect of lawyering and
justice which occurs in the nonadversarial process. Or, in my terms, and
yours too, why has the area of preventive law been so long neglected?
I prefer to approach the answer in two ways. Law school education has
been severely influenced over the years by the so-called case method. I
say "so-called" because the material for teaching has not been the whole
case but rather only the legal end result of an item of litigation. I would
prefer to call it the "appellate court opinion method." These materials for
teaching are attributed to C.C. Langdell 9 starting in 1870. There may be
some doubt about the attribution to Langdell, but such doubt is not
material to our discussion. The fact that these materials for teaching
were not immediately accepted is an interesting bit of the history of law
school education that really points out that some good things take a great
deal of time to become recognized.
What is important to our present discussion is that the so-called case
6 L. BRowN & E. DAUER, PLANNING By LAvsS, MATERIALS ON A NONADVERSARIAL LEGAL PROCESS
(1978).
' Barnhizer, Clinical Education at the Crossroads: The Need for Direction, 1977 B.Y.U.
L.REV. 1025, 1026 n.2.; Gee & Jackson, Bridging the Gap: Legal Education and Lawyer
Competency, 1977 B.Y.U. L.REv. 695 (1977).
' Brown, Strategies for Legal Education: Creative Presentation in Bankruptcy, 21 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 913 (1988), reviewing two books by L. LoPucKI, PLAYER'S MANUAL FOR THE
DEBTOR-CREDITOR GAmE (1985) and STRATEGIES FOR CREDmRS iN BAKNK'cv PR OCEEDINGS (1985).
' C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAw OF CONTRACTS (1871).
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method is a wonderful tool for teaching, in depth, the rules and principles
of law as applied and developed by the appellate courts. And because
court decisions arise out of the pro and con presentations of opposing
lawyers, court opinions lend themselves, rather easily, to that wonderful
mind sharpening tool we call the questioning dialogue. One point to bear
in mind is that it is so good as a teaching methodology that it is difficult
to make room for other materials. In recent decades legal education
materials have deepened and extended the opinions of the courts by
including in teaching texts and in the classroom discussion some non-
legal materials that bear upon the reasoning of the court and the
consequences to society of the court decisions.' 0
These teaching materials and teaching methods are often referred to as
"thinking like a lawyer." That simple statement is not a correct descrip-
tion. I prefer to call it "thinking like an appellate court judge." Further-
more, I would prefer that the "case method" be really a total case method.
Cases do not start in the appellate court, nor even in the trial court. They
start before the court process is invoked. They start in the lawyer's office
and even before that. If we were really teaching "thinking like a lawyer,"
we would start when the lawyer is first involved and carry on the
thinking process from that starting point.
For me, and for preventive law, the process of "thinking like a lawyer"
happens even where the court process is of no direct concern. A lawyer
who counsels a client about the client's will and family property is
engaged in "thinking like a lawyer." A lawyer who is engaged by a client
to assist in the start of a business and to determine whether or not to
incorporate, and if so how, is lawyering and thinking and deciding. The
lawyering that takes place is far more complex than knowledge of law.
The lawyering concerns clients, human relations, applied law, the
creation of alternatives that may be legal alternatives or extra-legal
alternatives, and all of the techniques that come within the scope of
preventive law.
Why are we so slow in putting all this into law school education? You
put your fingers on one important factor-participant observation. The
materials of this aspect of lawyering are not readily available in the law
library. The materials are out in the world of lawyering-in law offices,
in lawyers' minds, in law office files, in client experiences-in short, in
decisions that lie hidden from view. It takes participant observation, and
other kinds of research, to turn up the materials. It is much harder than
finding appellate opinions. Published opinions are too readily available,
easy to find, and come already indexed and organized in traditional
categories.
The excuse that students will learn about these lawyering things after
" See generally E. BROWN, LAWYERS, LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PUBLIC SERVICE (1948).
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they get out into the world and therefore these things are not worth
teaching is a poor excuse. Everything can be learned "outside." I find it
unfortunate that, as I have often said, "[Llegal education in this country
began in the law office and then forgot it.""
You and I have worked together for several years in this area of
nonadversarial law or preventive law. Would you say that there are
general principles worthy of law school teaching time in this field? Would
you say there is any less intellectual fulfillment in preventive law than in
adversarial law? And why is it that some in the academic world regard
this as only "clinical" education? Or if you do not care to address these
questions at this time, would you go beyond these questions and get into
some observations about the content of the teaching? Or maybe, just
maybe, you can treat all these questions together.
III. DAUER TO BROWN, AUGUST 5, 1988
I am, as usual, tardy in my reply to your most recent letter. I would
insist, though, that I am not the perpetrator of sloth, but rather the
beneficiary of the rather peculiar role which a professional school dean
plays. Unlike deans in the arts and sciences, who tend to devote all if not
most of their time to the framing of intellectual adventures and the
fashioning of curricular visions, the interest of the bench and bar in the
doings of a law school make a very close involvement of the school in the
doings of the bench and bar a virtue and a necessity. This is something
about which we might exchange thoughts in the future-the relationship
between the bar and the academy, and the way in which some academies
(not ours) have created defenses which they mistakenly thought neces-
sary to preserve their academic aspirations. But that is for another time.
Your letter has raised a number of ideas, and caused me to think about
a number of views-some trivial, some less so-to which I have come
from time to time. Perhaps I can weave them together into a single theme
by focusing on a bit of the intellectual history of American legal
education from which we have not to this day been rescued.
You mentioned Christopher Columbus Langdell.12 There are some
interesting aspects of the period in which Langdell was working, which I
believe had an impact on the design of legal education at Harvard in the
middle of the nineteenth century. That time was a "scientistic" time-an
age during which faith in the progress of science was beginning to sound
like a religion. It was the age of Darwin and Huxley and Wallace1 3 and
" Brown, Law Offices for Middle Income Clients, 40 CAL. ST. B.J. 720, 731 (1965); M.
MAYER, THE LAWYERS 71 (1967).
12 See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
13 Dauer, Law and the Life of the Mind, YALE L. REP., Winter 1980, 13 at 16.
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many of the great physicists whose names are still revered by our
brethren in the hard sciences. It was almost as if a field could be
respectable only if it was a science-only if it proceeded by way of the
scientific method.
Simultaneously, that same period of time was an era during which the
idea of a university law school was first coming to be widely shared. The
profession was in need of that validation which a university degree would
provide to the law, as a defense to a very corrosive and populist
anti-lawyer sentiment then rampant. The universities, for their part,
recognized that the bar was a powerful influence in the state legislatures,
which could be used to the advantage of higher education. And so the
notion of a university law school, operating at the graduate (rather than
baccalaureate) level, became a marriage of considerable convenience for
both sides.14 The difficulty, of course, was how to factor the study of law
as a professional matter (rather than as a branch of philosophy) into the
life of a university and make it sophistically "respectable." The solution
was obvious-law had to be a science.
Thus was born the Langdellian method. Indeed, the introduction to
Langdell's own casebook in Contracts,15 where the method was first given
its shape, speaks in the language of the laboratory man as clearly and
unambiguously as could be imagined. The upshot is that law needed to be
a respected academic discipline, and it therefore in 1873 needed to be a
science. Perhaps if the social sciences had been mature by the 1860's, law
might have been rather a different science than the one it became. We
might then have been interested in the actual behavior of its practi-
tioners and other important actors, rather than focusing only on the
outputs of a rather selective slice of its institutions, namely appellate
courts.
To Langdell, scientific method required both deduction (in applied
reasoning) and induction (in deriving general principles from the masses
of unruly data.) Appellate opinions were the data. It could be, so he must
have thought, no less scientific to draw general principles of the behavior
of law from its manifestations in numerous appellate opinions, than it
would be to draw principles about stellar physics from observations of
countless numbers of stellar spectra. But in saying that some cases were
"better" than others, Langdell made a most unscientific mistake-he
threw out data which did not accord with his preselected hypotheses.
That is, of course, absurd, and in any real science would not be tolerated
14 W. JOHNSON, SCHOOLED LAWYERS: A STUDY IN THE CLASH OF PROFESSIONAL CULTURES, at 21-22
(1978); REED, PRESENT-DAY LAW SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA, at 7-8 (1928).
15 C. LANGDELL, A SELECTION OF CASES ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, at vi (1871). "Law, considered
as a science, consists of certain principles or doctrines. To have such a mastery of these as
to be able to apply them with constant facility and certainty to the ever-tangled skein of
human affairs, is what constitutes a true lawyer: and hence to acquire that mastery should
be the business of every earnest student of law."
1988]
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1988
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
for a moment even by the most untutored and easily forgiven graduate
student.
The presence of law in the universities during that period, to put it
succinctly, had to be attended by an assertion that law enjoyed the same
degree of academic integrity and respectability that other disciplines
within the university were accorded. And there the seeds of dissent were
sown. With very few exceptions (engineering being one), the most
academic of the academic disdain the daily applications of their work,
protesting instead that they find their reward in pursing understanding
for its own sake. The notion of academic remove is integral to the prestige
of the pure academician. Law, however, is simply not capable of being
studied at a remove from its operations.
All this heritage, therefore, has created a very serious schism in legal
education which is both historically understandable and presently inex-
cusable. Some think of this as the "practice/theory" distinction; others
think of it as the difference between "substance" and "skill." To the extent
that clinical legal education has been seen as the tool for teaching skill,
it was inevitable that it should be ostracized from the dinner table where
the "real" academicians found their nurture. Its place on the curriculum
was left to an occasional after-dinner scrap. It became rugby rather than
football.
Now then, litigation provides an opportunity for an appellate court to
do a little philosophy-to think about the internal dynamics of legal
principles, to do some economics and sociology and political science along
the way, and to announce ideas about the fabric of the law (which just
happen to have the effect of resolving a dispute between two people whose
real problems will probably never be known to anyone reading the
opinion). That is very much the stuff of an academic sort of inquiry. What
you and I have called "preventive law" - essentially a mode of lawyering
addressed to the solution of those problems faced by real people under
real circumstances and with real constraints-may require enormous
degrees of ingenuity and good judgment and intelligence, but it does, to
those who would be at High Table in the university, appear to be more
like engineering than physics. It is not pure science; to its critics it is, at
worst, technology.
As I have suggested, that schism has its roots not only in the nature of
the subject but also in the nature of the times during which law and legal
education and intellectual culture in general were being formed. Our
legacy is two words (skill and substance) to describe education in the law
rather than one. As I tried to suggest in my earlier letter, I find that
distinction which also takes its toll on the litigation/prevention issue-
very unfortunate and dysfunctional.
There is another point, which I am not entirely sure relates closely to
what we have been discussing thus far. But it, too, was prompted by some
of your observations and deserves a moment's attention. This thought can
be described best with a single word: "complexity."
[Vol. 36:501
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One of the things that the case method of legal education does is
deprive the student of the opportunity to understand the complexity of
the operations of lawyering. That complexity exists along two different
axes. The first is substantive. While we present students with appellate
opinions (I shall not call them cases either, for they are not) in a given
course, all of the opinions offered in that course have to do with that one
subject matter. Some of the factual circumstances and some of the law
may indeed be complex, in a different sense of the word, but there is a
taxonomic simplicity to the issues being presented in any given appellate
opinion.
Problems don't exist that way in the world. They may in some kinds of
litigation, where the issues are boiled down to one or two jugular
questions, but in forward-looking planning, or preventive law, the
categories do not provide constraints at all. We have only to think about
the development of a small shopping center to realize just how many
things come together all at once in potentiating and sometimes inconsis-
tent ways: real property law, commercial finance, taxation, securities law
(if it is to be a widely-held partnership), contracts, and so on. (And if the
development is for a project in natural resources, it becomes vastly more
complex even than that.) And then something about the business of real
estate development. Not many law schools require that the students ever
put it all together in a way that is the daily stuff of the lawyer's preventive
law job.
Complexity has a second dimension. It is the interrelation between
what you have previously called the "legal" and the "extra-legal."16
Considering again the example of a shopping center development, there
are a number of constraints which come not from law but from the
economy; from the client's own financial experience and wherewithal;
from the interests of others, both competitive and collaborative which
raise problems and issues that are not amenable to strictly legal
analyses. Here the difference between litigation and preventive law is at
its brightest; and here is where, I believe, we may find some explanation
for legal education's relative disregard of the latter.
A lawsuit is a process by which a set of human problems are translated
into a language which legal institutions can understand. The law does
not ask people whether they are happy or sad or feel injured or have
problems or have had hopes and ambitions dashed. It asks very different
questions, questions like, "Was the buyer's act of providing the specifi-
cations a sufficient involvement to effect a disclaimer of the implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose otherwise mandated by the
16 The contrast of the terms "legal" and "extralegal" first appeared in Brown, The
Educational Aspects of Preventive Law: A Lawyer Suggests Integration of Study of Avoiding
Litigation in Law Courses, 1949 HARv. L. REC. 20.
19881
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1988
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
Uniform Commercial Code?" What the parties really care about, in
contrast to all of that, is money and goods that work. But in every case
litigation changes people problems into legal issues so they can be
processed by legal institutions. It therefore simplifies those issues enor-
mously-what is left of them are the legal components. In planning,
however, analyzing the legal issues as if they existed apart from the
matrix of hopes and fears and money and needs and purposes and
personalities, is a perfectly useless way to think about law. It's a messy
business, festooning our principles with the sordid ambitions of people
trying to scratch out ever larger fortunes, or more satisfying lives.
In other words, by teaching adversarial law, we can teach law. When
we strive to teach preventive law, we must teach both far more and far
less than law. Preventive law requires a great deal of additional com-
plexity.
Now, there are some places in some law schools where this complexity
is explored-we, for example, have been experimenting with the idea of
a "master class." In this, a practitioner would be in residence at the law
school for a two- or three-week period, and would take a small group of
students through a project-something drawn from his or her practice,
perhaps, though not necessarily so. This would truly be a "case" method
of teaching-a focus on a matter which has all of the complexity, in both
the dimensions I have just described, which characterizes most of what
law really does outside of courts, in real life. We and other schools do have
courses in "business planning"; and sometimes even "estate planning"
pays attention to love and greed as well as to the rule in Shelley's Case
and the Doctrine of Worthier Title. But those are exceptions and even in
those cases we do not very often see clinical teaching strategies being
factored in with the classroom in any serious way.
Lest I be misunderstood, let me say that this much is not sour grapes,
nor criticism for its own sake. For legal education has before it an
enormous opportunity. That it has not been exploited until now may be a
gift to us which I, for one, believe is ready to be realized.
IV. BROWN TO DAUER, AUGUST 11, 1988
I have the luxury not afforded a Dean, or other activists like busy
lawyers. Life has presented me with the opportunity to devote myself to
intellectual ventures like this one. Yes, at another time, I would welcome
an exchange with you on the relation between the bar and the academy.
Even so, there is a bit of that now.
The notion that I have expressed from time to time about the birth of
the so-called case method is perhaps more simplistic than your explana-
tion. An explanation which, I confess, I had not considered. Yours
concerns the embodiment of the scientific method of the middle of the
nineteenth century into the use of court opinions in a sort of scientific
[Vol. 36:501
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manner. Mine comes closer to the relation of the bar and the academy. It
seems to me that C.C. Langdell was a practicing lawyer specializing in
appellate litigation before he became a teacher of law. He brought a
portion of his experience as a lawyer into the courtroom. The direction
that you and I would like to see is to continue bringing lawyering
experiences into the classroom. That may seem evolutionary; actually the
change would be a considerable leap. We need to bring to the academy
more of the lawyering environment than Langdell brought.
A way must be found to accomplish that sort of goal. The bridge that I
have felt could do the trick comes with the concept of "decision." Law
school education is built around the process and substance of the
decisions made by appellate courts. The concept of decision seems to be an
acceptable academic exercise. The practicing lawyer side of me tells me
that lawyers make decisions. The fact is that in the preventive law area,
the law office is the place and the lawyer is the person established by our
society as the authoritative source of decisions concerning matters of law.
The inquiry becomes: what decisions are made by lawyers, how are
such decisions made, what factors are, or should be, taken into account in
making those decisions, and what is the effect of those decisions? If we
desire to stick to the philosophic beginnings of law school teaching
materials we might be concerned with the science of decision making.
Frankly, I have not been able to tie my thoughts to the mathematics or
science of decision or game theory largely, I believe, because of lack of
knowledge of that sort of theory. If, as I believe, there is decision, there
must be theory, there must be general principles, there must be intellec-
tual challenge.
Your example of the shopping center is fine. There must be a decision
to go forward or not with that project. The ultimate decision involves the
client as well as the lawyer. The factors that go into such a decision
include legal and extra-legal factors. The techniques of arriving at that
decision include the creative process of suggesting and evaluating vari-
ous methods of accomplishing the goal. As to the law, one of the realities
is that the planning lawyer seeks to determine a body of law that helps
accomplish the goal with as much legal certainty as is attainable. Law
school education as currently constituted is not designed to think in those
terms. The shopping center is expected to conform to the normal require-
ments of law and society. The objective is to get the planning done so as
to accept as much "normal," "clear" and "certain" law as possible. The
objective in law school education seems to be to train students to deal
with the "abnormal," the "unusual," and the "borderline" situations. The
skill of working with the abnormal (the hard case) is, I believe, a different
skill from working with legal certainty.
But I hear it said that appellate courts lay down the law. What the
courts do becomes a rule of conduct for all persons and legal entities.
Appellate court opinions affect all of society. Even if that be true (there
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is some doubt as to "all" such decisions), I plead that many decisions made
in law offices affect all of society. A clause in a document may swing
through lawyering habits and vitally affect the way things are done. A
kind of "common law of lawyering" takes place. I dare say that the way
that the shopping center arrangement is structured is derived, in part,
from the experiences of lawyers who structured previous shopping
centers. And the way this new one might be structured, if it be novel in
some respect, will affect the way future deals are structured. The simple
example I have used in teaching concerns my speculation as to the origin
of the attorney fee clause in negotiable instruments. Certainly such a
provision did not arise in an appellate court opinion. It arose in a law
office either at the suggestion of a lawyer or a client. The significant point
is that the clause has swept through society, has affected and influenced
society and has become as strongly embodied in the conduct and habits of
people and financial institutions as any appellate court opinion ever has.
The challenge is to identify law office decisions that have been creative
and influential. The challenge is to explore the decision-making process,
to find the general principles, and to examine the factors that cause such
decisions to take place. Or, I can put the project less dramatically, or
maybe more dramatically, by pointing out that more decisions affecting
human conduct are made in law offices than are made by all the trial
courts of the land.
You are correct in your recent letter in pointing out that the parties
(persons who act and live in our society) care less about law than they do
about "money and goods that work." I cannot let that comment stand
without pointing out that later in that same paragraph you expanded
that guiding principle into, "the matrix of hopes and fears and money and
needs and purposes and personalities. . . ." Competent lawyers are, but
appellate courts are not, concerned with this entire field of vision. The
hopes, the fears, the personalities of litigants or clients are not legal
issues. Preventive law is concerned with the whole; not only with the
"law."
A "master class" seems to me to be an excellent method of getting at the
teaching of the decision processes of the lawyer in the planning context.
There may have been some earlier efforts in somewhat the same
direction. I recall the first edition of a book by the late Addison Mueller1 7
which was devoted to the construction of an apartment building. Profes-
sor Mueller, by the way, had been in the lumber business before he
became a law teacher. (I, too, had several years of business experience
before becoming a law teacher.) I participated, some years ago with Tom
" A. MUELLER, CONTRACT IN CONTEXT (1952).
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Shaffer18 and David Link' 9 in a course on the practice of law. We used
examples but did not have the idea of a master class project in planning.
Legal education might now be better equipped for a master class in a
planning venture than in prior years. Preventive law is beginning to
arrive as a separate field of study with its own techniques and approaches
and its own thought processes.
Your first letter to me called attention to clinical legal education and to
the limited scope of its endeavors: the litigation process. It has been a
challenge to find clinical (actual, live, current) teaching material in
preventive law. It may be that you hit on a gem.
Your observation that a university degree in law was considered "a
defense to a very corrosive and populist anti-lawyer sentiment then
rampant" deserves reconsideration. Roscoe Pound addressed the subject
"The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice" in an address to an annual meeting of the American Bar
Association. 20 Karl Llewellyn wrote strikingly in 1937 of the "Bar's
Troubles, and Poultices-and Cures. ' '21 Little has changed; certainly the
university degree in law has not staved the tide of dissatisfaction. I am
not sure what will so long as the function of lawyers is pictured as dealing
solely or even principally with trouble, with conflict, and with dispute.
There is inherent dissatisfaction in trouble, conflict and dispute. Yet, it
may be that the adverse sentiment stems from a deeper source: a
resentment regarding those aggravating and costly dispute situations in
life that need never have occurred. It is at this point that preventive law
may offer a different approach to the public awareness of a constructive
function of the profession. Might it be that preventive law will go a bit of
the way to rescue the public image by showing a deep interest in problem
avoidance, in the prevention of legal trouble, and in providing a legally
healthier way of life?
I cannot end this letter without reference to a poster that hangs on my
wall in my law office and stares at me constantly.
The society which scorns excellence in plumbing as a humble
activity and tolerates shoddiness in philosophy because it is an
exalted activity will have neither good plumbing nor good phi-
losophy. Neither its pipes nor its theories will hold water.
'8 Robert E.R. Huntley, Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University; author, FAITH
AND THE PROFESSIONS (1987), ON 1EING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER: LAW FOR THE INNOCENT (1981).
19 Dean and Professor of Law, Notre Dame University School of Law.
20 See Brown, The Role of the Law Office in the Administration of Justice, 67 A.B.A. J.
1127 (1981).
" See Llewellyn, The Bar's Troubles and Poultices-and Cures, 5 LAW & CONTEMP. PROSS.
104 (1938).
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When I told John 0. Mudd, then Dean of the School of Law at the
University of Montana about this poster he wrote, "Thank you for a copy
of the philosophy/plumbing quotation. I've thought it might be modified
slightly to come closer to home:
A legal profession which scorns excellence in practice as a
humble activity and tolerates shoddiness in jurisprudence be-
cause it is an exalted activity will have neither effective lawyer-
ing nor sound scholarship."
V. DAUER TO BROWN, AUGUST 20, 1988
Thanks for the philosophy. I don't know much about pipes or plumbing,
yet I would suggest that John Mudd's epithet is enticing but incomplete.
Indeed, the position I have been trying to articulate in this exchange of
letters is precisely that the distinction between "plumbing" and "schol-
arship" is false. Let me try it another way: The breakthrough which legal
education as a whole must achieve before it can capture the benefits of a
comprehensive mode of professional training is the proposition that we
must regard, as being worthy of serious intellectual investigation, the
activities of practicing lawyers. If I wanted a trope for my tripe, that
would be it.
This concept also embraces the notion of lawyer decision-making,
which you outlined in your letter. I would again steal a phrase that you
have used in the past, and suggest that we in the law schools should set
about building what we have not heretofore recognized as being in need
of being built, a jurisprudence of the lawyering process. 22
I take the word "jurisprudence" to mean the study of the behavior of
decisional institutions. As you have pointed out, lawyers are decisional
institutions. While this feature of their activity may not appear so readily
in their litigation roles, it clearly does in their preventive, planning
efforts where there is no authoritative decision-making provided by the
state. It was Tom Shaffer who once said, "... a law office decision will
probably affect the life of the client ... more than any decision of any
court."
23
What are the forces which shape the ways in which this authoritative
yet low visibility decision process takes place? Clearly the economics of
the practice present some constraints and forces; the culture of the
profession and the learning of that culture which law students endure is
another; perhaps even the sociology of the ways in which the practice is
22 See Brown & Shaffer, Toward a Jurisprudence for the Law Office, 17 AM. J. Jums. 125
(1972).
23 Shaffer, Christian Theories of Professional Responsibility, 48 S. CAL. L. REv. 721, 727
(1975).
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organized and its practitioners recruited have something to do with it.
There is, in a study of the jurisprudence of lawyering, as much opportu-
nity for broad-scale theory building as there is in the construction of a
jurisprudence of the appellate court process. 24 Perhaps that notion could
be the common ground, or the linkage between those who would exalt
philosophy and those who would solder the plumbing.
A very nice example of this possibility occurred just last year at the
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, where our colleague Wilton Sogg25
undertook to work with his students on a problem which I, at least, had
not previously heard being addressed. That problem concerns the ways in
which lawyers behave under conditions of legal uncertainty-when, for
example, an area of law is in flux, or a statute or common law principle
is about to be addressed and revised by a court or a legislature, or where
there has just built up some stress in an area of doctrine which suggests
that an evolutionary step is not far away. What do lawyers do under those
circumstances? Do they become protective, in the sense of being risk
averse? Do they (and for whom) increase their involvement in law-
making activities at the legislative or rule-making level, so they can have
a hand in shaping the outcome rather than merely waiting for it to
happen? How does this uncertainty affect the process of counseling? And
with what effect on the translation of law into human behavior? The work
in that course by Wilton's students is the first of which I am aware on that
range of questions, and others related to the general theme. That might
give a flavor of what it means to talk about a jurisprudence of lawyering
operations.
Underlying this exchange of letters between us, there is an assertion
which we have both been acting on but have not made explicit. That is,
that some of what we see as being inadequate in legal education is
attributable to the focus of legal education being placed almost exclu-
sively on the litigation mode of lawyering. Yes, litigation is good and
important; but it can't be all of what is good and important in the practice
of real world lawyering. It is only when we begin to think as well about
the nonlitigative activities of lawyers that many of these other issues
begin to arise. We might, therefore, take the additional step of suggesting
that an emphasis in legal education on the preventive would be useful not
only for its own sake, but for the sake of elucidating many other themes
as well.
Again an example comes to mind, and that is the circumstance of
professional responsibility and legal ethics.
There are in the litigative contexts ethical problems of delicious
subtlety. But the conventional conversations about those problems begin
with an important leg up, in that the lawyer who is acting as an advocate
24 See generally, L. BROWN AND E. DAUER, PERSPECTIVES ON THE LAWYER AS PLANNER (1978).
25 See Sogg, Coping with Change: The Lawyer's Role, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 547 (1988).
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can explain the consequences and ethics of his or her zeal by pointing to
the existence of a neutral manager of the process, and by reciting the
litany that good advocacy is causally related to "truth." All of that is very
difficult, really, even though it may be easy to state, but it does not begin
to describe the additional difficulty present when we consider ethical
problems in the nonlitigative setting. The ways in which lawyers deal
with clients, with each other, and with the public who are affected by the
activities of their clients, when they are not dealing with a matter then
(or likely to be) in court, are more complex than many which occur in the
litigation realm.26 (And, again, by no means do I believe that the latter
are easy.) The absence of the neutral tribunal removes an important
source of ethical safe harbor.27 The moral weight is more intensively ours.
One final thought as well about the "skills" aspect of contemporary
legal education. Think again about the fact that the typical law school
curriculum includes substantive courses, and courses in advocacy skills.
Most law schools' curricula do not include courses in "planning." Yes,
there are courses in Estate Planning and Business Planning and some-
times one or two other things, but very seldom do you see something in
the planning realm akin in its generality to the collection of courses
developed over time in the realm of litigation skills. This suggests that
we must believe that litigation skills can be abstracted from individual
substantive areas and taught as a coherent whole, but that planning
skills cannot. We have theories about adjudication; we even engage in
arguments about which way of teaching it is best; we talk about the
litigation "process" as if it has (which it may) a coherence even when
divorced from the particulars of substance and person. Yet by contrast,
and for all the reasons which we have rehearsed, legal education in
general must believe that there are very few coherent principles-apart
from the particular substance-in those operations which make up the
greatest bulk of lawyers' time. Nonsense.
We could, you and I, go on and on in this way as we have on those many
delightful occasions when we have spent time together, up close and
personal. But perhaps for the present we can say that we have succeeded
in getting into this exchange of correspondence at least the core elements
of the things that have motivated our own work and perceptions of what
we see around us.
If I may, I would like to return briefly to where I began, with a
somewhat personal note. More than I would have guessed, a position in
the administration of a law school is an extraordinary opportunity to see
the quiltwork of forces and constituencies which regard the school as
26 See generally Brown & Dauer, Professional Responsibility in Nonadversarial Lawyer-
ing: A Review of the Model Rules, 1982 AM. B. FOuND. REs. J. 519.
27 Dauer & Leff, The Lawyer as Friend, 86 YALE L. J. 573, 580 (1977).
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having some importance to them. It provides equally well a chance to
watch law as a discipline claim a place as of right at the trough of
intellectual self-assertion. We care too much about that, I think. Because
we have no need to apologize for the intellectual depth of what our
practitioners do, we in the universities have no need to distance ourselves
from what our practitioners do, even as we grapple, in our reflective
moments, with issues the cerebral complexity and "scientific" rigor of
which are rivalled by few if any other disciplines.
As a law professor, I have for the past twenty years been living two
lives. I earnestly hope that in the next twenty years I may live one.
EDWARD A. DAUER AND LOUIS M. BROWN
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